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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RAYMOND STEWART,
Plaintiff and Resp<mdent,

-vsJOHN L. SULLIVAN and
RICHARD lVIONK ALLEN

Case No.
12958

'
Defendants and A ppella.nts.

Respondent's Brief on Appeal
STATEJ\1ENT OV' THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR'l'
The action was dismissed by the District Court because of the failure of plaintiff's former counsel to
answer interrogatories. The Order of May 25, 1972,
from which defendants appeal, provides that the dismissal is to be "without prejudice". After the dismissal,
plaintiff filed a new action against defendants in the
District Court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff seeks to affirm the Order of Dismissal '
without prejudice so that he might proceed with his
action against the defendants.
STATE~MENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile
accident which occurred on November 22, 1968. The details of the accident and injuries may be found in a ,
comprehensive case evaluation which is part of an affidavit of plaintiff's counsel (R-72). There is no opposing affidavit, and for purpo:'les of this appeal, it can
be assumed that both defendants are guilty of either
negligence or willful misconduct, and that the injuries
to plaintiff were extreme and disabling (special dam- '
ages and loss of wages alone totaling some $121,581.72).
Plaintiff has never had his day in court, the case
having been dismissed for failure on the part of his
counsel to answer interrogatories. The sole question on
appeal is whether the dismissal was with or without
prejudice.

Plaintiff's counsel at the time of fili11g the action
herein was J. Lambert Gibson. :Mr. Gibson represented
the plaintiff throughout the early stages of the proceeding. After a notice of readiness for trial had ~een
filed the defendant served l\Ir. Gibson with wntten
'
.
interrogatories. l\Ir. Gibson failed to answer the mterrogatories and failed to notify his client about them.
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After several attempts were made by defendants to
get the answers, the matter was noticed for hearing and
eventually on April 2, 1971, Judge Stewart 1\1. Hanson dismissed plaintiff's complaint (R-50). Mr. Gibson did not appear at the hearing. The order did not
specify whether it was to be with or without prejudice.
In September of 1971, plaintiff contacted a new
attorney, Neil D. Schaerrer, and advised him that he
could not get l\fr. Gibson to explain the status of the ·
case; he also requested .Mr. Schaerrer at that time to
take over the case (R-67). After some difficn1ty, the
plaintiff was able to locate l\Ir. Gibson to obtain the
file, at which time Mr. Gibson informed him that the
case had been dismissed without prejudice (R-fi8). Up
to that time, the plaintiff was completely unaware of
any dismissal ( R-95). After obtaining l\Jr. Gibson's
file, :Mr. Schaerrer telephoned David K. l\Tin<ler and
was advised that lHr. Winder represented defendant Allen and State Farm l\f utual Insurance Company
( R-68). l\fr. '1\Tinder told l\Ir. Schaerrer that he had
prepared the order of dismissal and that the case had
been dismissed without prejudice; Mr. \Vinder suggested that an attempt he made to settle the case and
suggested that Mr. Schaerrer prepare and provide for
him a detailed case evaluation supplying among other
things the information requested in the interrogatories
which l\1r. Gibson had failed to furnish (R-68). Mr.
Winder also told :Mr. Schaerrer that after the dismissal
had been signed, he discussed the matter with l\Ir. Gibson and told l\Ir. Gibson of the court's ruling and that
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l\Jr. Gibson ad,Tised him that he was heavily involved
in the legislature and had been unable to answer the interrogatories and that he would furnish the answers to
interrogatories to l\lr. 'Vinder at a later date (R-69).
l\Ir. 'Vinder also told l\1r. Gibson that there was no
problem about the dismissal because the action could
always be refiled within a year and that the Statute of
Limitations had not run anyway (R-85). It might be
noted at this point that l\'lr. lVinder at pages 8 through
10 of appellant Allen's brief admits that at the time, he
thought the dismissal was without prejudice, but now
concludes on page 10 he was erroneous in interpreting
the legal effect of the document which he himself prepared and that l\Ir. Gibson could have done his own research, and that he owed no fiduciary duty to Gibson.
After the conversation with l\Ir. 'V'inder, Mr.
Schaerrer went to work obtaining the voluminous medical, hospital and other records and information necessary to prepare the case evaluation, which required some
considerable time ( R-G9). Afte1· the case evaluation had
been prepared, l\1r. Schaerrer presented copies to counsel for both of the defendants. At that time, he was
utlvised for the first time hy l\lr. Schoenhals, counsel
for defendant Sullivan and USF&G Insurance Company, that the dismissal was with prejudice (R-~O_} since
under Rule 41 ( b) of the Utah Rules of C1v1l Procedure, a dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories
would operate as a matter of law as an adjudication upon
the merits unless the court otherwise specifies. Mr.
SchaeiTer later discussed the matter with Judge HanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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son who told him it was intended that the order be without prejudice (R-71); Judge Hanson directed Mr.
~chaerrer to prepare an order for his signature coITectmg the error so as to properly reflect the wav the order
should have been entered (R-71). Such an. order was
prepared and entered on March 16, 1972, ( R-55).
Pollowing the entry of the Amended Order of Dismissal on :March 16, 1972, hoth of the defendants made
motions to set aside the Amended Order and to determine that the original dismissal was with prejudice. At
the same time, the plaintiff moved that the court grant
relief from the original judgment on additional grounds
under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides for relief from a judgment or order for
any reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. These motions were heard on April 13, 1972,
and defendants convinced Judge Hanson that he had no
power to grant relief from the original judgment; accordingly, he set aside the Amended Order of Dismissal
and denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend on additional
grounds (R-84, 97).
After the hearing on April 13, 1972, and after
J uclge Hanson had announced his ruling, but before
the preparation and entry of the actual order on :May
3, 1972, plaintiff learned that J. Lambert Gibson had
been suspended by the Utah State Bar Commission from
the practice of law on the 14th of l\fay, 1971, (R-93}'
that the client was never aware of the suspension (R95), and that 1\-lr. Gibson could not have taken any im-
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mediate action after the entry of the original order of
dismissal to protect his client's interest. Plaintiff, therefore, made a motion to receive further affidavits and
hear further arguments before makillg entry of the
April 13th ruling (R-88). This matter was noticed for
hearing on l\Iay 16; however, defendants prepared and
caused to lrnve signed and entered Judge 1-lanson's ruling of April 13; this was done on l\Iay 3, 1972 (R-97).
When the matter was again heard before Judge
Hanson on .l\Iay lo, 1972, after the additional affidavits
had been filed, the Juclge correctly concluded that his
prior ruling of April la (Order entered on l\fay 3,
1972) was erroneous; that a substantial injustice would
he done if that niling were allowed to stand; and that
he did in fact have the m1thority under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure to grant relief to the plaintiff from
the original juclgme11t of dismissal in April of 1971.
Accordi1wl'' Judge Hanson set aside his Order of :May
~ ·''
3, 1972, and ruled that the original dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was to be "without prejudice." (R. 102)
It is this order that plaintiff seeks to have affirmed on
appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
PLAINTIFF RELlEF UNDER RULE 60(b) (7)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ·
provides as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; ( 2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, for any
cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4 ( e) and the defendan~ has
failed to appear in said action; ( 5) the Judgment is void; ( 6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is bas~d !ms been reversed or otherwise vacated, or It IS no longer
equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other
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8
reas~n justifying relief from the operation of

the Judgment. The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1) , ( 2) ,
~ 3) , ( 4) , not more than 3 months after the
Judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken."
Since the motion of plaintiff's ne\\' counsel was made
more than three ( 3) months from the date of the first
order of dismissal, plaintiff must come within Subsection (7) which allows relief for "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
It is plaintiff's position that the facts here clearly justify relief under this subsection.
Rule 60 (h) (7) has heen construed by the Utah
Supreme Court on several occasions. One of the leading cases wherein the Con rt invoked Subsection ( 7)
of the rule is J)i,ron -v.~- Di,1·on, 121 Utah 250, 240 P.2d
1211. In that case, the Court held that a formal order
signed and entered upon the erroneous assumption that
it conformed to a direction of the Court is more than
a mere inaclYertence and can he set riside more than
three ( 3) months after its entry. The Court in noting
that it would work a "grave injustice to permit the
order to stand" also notc<l that e\·en in the absence of
Rule 60 ( h) ( 7). the Court would lun-e inherent power
to set aside the formal order. This case is somewhat sim·
ilar to the instant case in that here the parties, including
plaintiff's counsel, defendants' counsel and the .District
Judge, were au· under the erroneous assumpbo~ t~at
the original Order of Dismissal was without prejudice.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Another case in point is Nev -vs- Harrison, 5 Utah
2d 217, 2!)9 P.2d lll4 where the Court set aside a default judgment some eleven ( ll) months after the date
of judgment. The only ground stated was that defendant was under the mistaken belief that she was
fully protected under a Divorce Decree ordering her
ex-husband to pay certain obligations. The Court concluded that Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) was intended to govern this
type of situation, and pointed out the strong policy of
the Jaw to liberally construe the statutes and rules of
procedure in favor of trial on the merits. The Court
also recognized the latitude of discretion given the trial
court in such matters and stated as follows:
"The Utah decisions relied upon by plaintiff recognize the firmly established principle
that it is largely within the discretion of the
trial court whether a default should he relieved,
which discretion will not be disturbed unless
there is a patent abuse thereof."
The N elf -vs- Harrison case is on all fours. with t11e instaut case, as here we have a mistaken belief as to the
effect of an order, plus the exercise of discretion on
the part of the trial court in plaintiff's favor.
· A case not involvin(J"
Subsection ( 7) of Rule 60 (b)
b
•
hut which strongly sets forth the policy of the law m
granting relief from defaults is JJI ayhcw -vs- Standm·d
Gil.wnite Company, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951. In
that case, the Supreme Court found an abuse of discre. court f or f a1·1·mg to grant
tion and re\'ersed the trial
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relief. In speaking for a unanimous court, Justice
Crockett wrote as follows :
"It is unclouhtedly correct that the trial
court is endowed with considemble latitude of
discretion in granting or denying such motions.
However, it is also true that the court cannot
act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be
?'ene~·ally indulgent toward permitting full
mqmry and know ledge of disputes so they can
be settled advisedly and in conformity with
law and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly
and irrevocably on a party without a hearing
is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It is
f unclamental in our system of justice that each
party to a conh'oversy should be afforded an
opportunity to present his side of the case. For
that reason, it is quite uniformly regarded as
an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a
default judgment where there is reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear, and timely application is
made to set it aside."

Utah cases cited hy the appellant· do not support
their position hut, in fact, support the position of the
respondent. 1-Varrcn ·l'S· Di,ron Ranch Cornpany, 128
Utah 416, 260 P.2d 74'1, upon which both defendants
rely, involves a situation where the court refused to set
aside a default judgment. The case simply stands for
the proposition that the Supreme Court will not re;erse
a decision of the trial court unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Although in this case (which inyo}ved an entirely different fact situation) the Su-
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preme Court. refused to substitute its judgment for
that of the tnal court. The court commented that
'
"Discretion must he exercised in furtherance of justice and the court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to the
end that a party may have a hearing."

As to the matter of discretion, the court also stated as
follows:
":'he allowance of a vacation of judg~
ment is a creature of equity designed to relieve
against harshness of enforcing a judgment,
which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a
claim or defense.*** Equity considers factors
which may be inelevant in actions at law, such
as the * * * hardship in granting or denying
relief. Although an equity court no longer has
complete discretion in granting or denying relief it may exercise wide judicial discretion in
weighing the factors of fairness and public
convenience, and this court on appeal will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of' this
discretion is clearly shown."

I,

I

In· the case of Board of Education of Granite School
District -vs- Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, the
trial court set aside a default judgment entered against
one defendant, but refused to set aside the default of
another defendant because the court did not believe
the defendant's excuse and believed the def~~~ ~as
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deliberate; again, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the discretion of the trial judge. In the case
of Shaw -v.~- Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949, the
court held that the plaintiff could maintain an independent action to set aside a Decree of Adoption on the
grounds of fraud upon the court even though seventeen
( 17) months had elapsed since the entry of the decree
and even though under Rule GO (b) ( 3), a motion for
relief based upon fraud must be filed within three (3)
months.
Rule 60 ( b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is patterned after Rule HO ( b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Subsection (7) of the Utah rule is
identical to Subsection ( 6) of the Federal rule, which
provides relief for " ( 6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Under the
Federal rule, motions under Subsections ( 1) , ( 2) and
( 3) can be made within one year which differs from
the three months limitation under the Utah rule. There
are numerous federal cases interpreting Rule 60 ( b) ( 6)
of the Fecleral Rules. l\Iany of these cases may be of
help to the court here.
The u11clerlying principle of Federal Ru 1 e
60 ( b) ( ()) is explained by Justice Black in the leading
case of Klapprott -v.~- U11itcd State.~, 335 U.S. 601, 69
S.Ct. 384, 93 L.E<l. 266 wherein the plaintiff was
granted relief from a default judgment of denaturalization after the judgment had been entered for four years.
There it was stated,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In sim~le English, the language of the
othe~ reaso~ clause, for all reasons except

,

the five particularly specified, vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments ~hen~ver. such action is appropriate to
accomplish Justice."

In interpreting the Klapprott and other federal cases
Moore in his work on Federal Practice at Sect.io~
60.27(2) sums up the effect of Subsection (6) as fol-.
lows:
~·Seen in perspective, clause ( 6) is clearly
a residual clause to cover unforeseen contingencies; intended to be a means for accomplishing justice in, what may be termed
generally, exceptional situations; and so confined, does not put the finality of judgments
generally at large."

.Moore also points out that in most cases, litigation is
handled by lawyers and whatever negligence is involved
in the losing of cases is theirs, not the personal negligence of their clients. It is pointed out that the federal
decisions have shown considerable sympathy in invoking Rule 60 ( h) ( 6) in favor of an innocent litigant who
has had an incompetent or a sloppy lawyer. l\fany courts
have held that gross negligence of a lawyer is sufficient
to afford relief under Rule 60 ( b) ( 6). See Barber ·VS·
Turberville, 215 }?.2d 34; Lucas ·t'S· City of Juneau,
(D. Alaska) 20 F.R.D. 407; In Re: Estate of Cremida..'1
(D. Alaska) 14 F.R.D. 15 where attack on judgment
came some three years after it was entered.
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I'. Steuart, Inc. -vs- lllatther.tw,.
329 I• .2d 234 where plaintiff's case was dismissed for
failure to prosecute due to negligence of counsel. Two
years later, through different counsel, plaintiff filed a
motion to vacate the judgment. The District Court denied the motion and on appeal, the Court of Appeal..,
held that the District Court had abused its discretion
in denying relief under Rule ()0 (b) ( 6). The court
wrote:
.

.t~ leading case is L.

"Clause ( 6) is broad enough to pennit
relief when as in this case personal problems
of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a
client's case and mislead the client."
Other cases following the Steuart decision and granting
relief for neglect of counsel are King -v.Y- lllordowanec
(D. R. I.) 4() F .R.D. 47 4 (motion filed one year and
nine months after entry of judgment); Transport Pool
Dit"ision of Container Leasing, Inc. -vs- Joe Jone.~
Truclt·ing Company, (N.D. Ga.) 319 F.Supp. 1308.
Under the federal cases, there is no question but what
plaintiff is entitled to the relief he seeks. It would seem
that the Utah rule ought to be construed more, and not
less, liberal than the federal rule because our limitation
period for coming under the other subsections of the
rule is much shorter.
It would seem that under the federal interpretations that gross negligence of counsel alone is sufficient
to grant relief. Under the Utah decisions, a mistaken
belief as to the effect of an order is sufficient to grant
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relief. Plaintiff here qualifies under both reasons. However, there are even additional reasons in this case to
justify the invoking of Rule 60(b) (7).
l\fr. Gibson in his affidavit alleges that he relied
upon statements made by l\Ir. Winder in not taking
prompt action to obtain relief from the order (R-86).
Thus, the element of estoppel comes into existence as
counsel for both defendants seem to acknowledge that
there would have been no problem in setting the order
aside had the motion been made within three months. In
Rice -vs- Granite School District, 28 Utah 2d 22, 456
P.2d 159, this court said,

"YVhere the delay in commencing an action
is induced bv the conduct of the defendant, or
his privies, ~r an insurance adjuster acting in
his behalf, it cannot be availed of by any of
them as a defense.
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversarv into a false sense of security, thereby
subje~ting his claim to the bar of limitations,
and then be heard to plead that very delay
as a defense to the action when brought. Acts
or conduct which wrongfully induce a party
to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim
will be made may create an estoppel against
pleading the Statute of Limitations."
In this case, the delay in taking action to seek reli~f
from the judgment was thus attributable to defendants
own conduct.
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.

In summing up the reasons why plaintiff is en-.
bt~e~ to relief, we fincl all of the following elements
ex1stmg:
I. Gross negligence on the part of plaintiff's

counsel in failing to answer interrogatories
after having been given many opportunities to <lo so.

2. A bona fide mistaken belief on the part of
aJl parties as to the legal effect of the order
of dismissal.
8. Estoppcl resulting from relinnce upon
statements made by defendant's counsel.
4. Extreme, severe and totally disabling in-

juries to plaintiff and clear liability against
the <lef endants.

5. Complete innocence on the part of plaintiff himself.
6. No claimed prejudice on the part of either
defendant resulting from the delay.
7. Policy of law to liberally constme the rules
of procedure in favor of deciding cases on
the merits.
8. Liability insurance coverage by both defendants and the policy of law to provide protection to accident victims and not allow
dismissals for unprejudicial technicalities.
9. Ruling of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff.
If there were ever a case where Rule 60 ( b) ( 7)
ought and should be properly invoked, it is this case.
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POINT II
THE RELIEF GRAN'l'ED BY THE TRIAL
COURT IS ALSO PROPER UNDER RULE
60(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
An additional ground for supporting the order of
the District Court is Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides for the correction of ·
clerical errors.
In the Order of March 16, 1972, (R-55) Judge
llanson recites on his own motion that a clerical error
was made and that the order should have been prepared
"without prejudice as directed by the court." Affidavits were then filed by defendants' counsel to rebutt
the recital in the order. .1\Ir. Schoenhals states that the
court simply granted a motion without comment ( R80) ; and l\Ir. \Vinder states he cannot remember exactly
what was said, but would have prepared the order accordingly if the court had specifically directed that it
be without prejudice ( R-60). They thereupon rely upon
the cnse of Richards ·tw- SiddowaJJ, 24 Utah 2d 314,
471 P.2d 143 which seems to hold that unless the court
actually makes a spe~ific pronouncement, any error, regardless of intent, would be judicial error rather than
a clerical error and not subject to correction under Rule
60 (a).
It would seem that the recital of the District Judge
in a formal order as to what was pronounced, ought to
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prevail over the rather inconclusive affidavits of counsel. This type of error, that is, the mode of disposition.
of an action, is generally held to be subject to correction ~s a clerical error. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgements,
Sect10n 204.

POINT III
TIIERE \VAS XO ERROR IN THE TRIAL
JUDGE RECONSIDERING AND CHANGING
HIS RULING, AND THIS POINT IS NOT A
BON i\ FIDE ISSUE ON .APPE1\ L.
'Vhen Judge IIanson first heard the arguments of
defendants, he was apparently convinced that he could
not legally amend the original Order of Dismissal and,
therefore, ruled that it must stand as entered, the legal
effect of which would be to deprive plaintiff of his
day in court. Plaintiff, after discovering other information and filing additional affidavits, moved that this
ruling he reconsidered and after further hearing, Judge
Hanson recognized that the prior ruling was wrong.
Both defendants now claim that under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the District Judge is powerless to
correct an error of law. even though the motion for
reconsideration was made within ten (IO) days as provided bv Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff would submit that this is not a bona fide issue
on appeal, because if Judge Hanson had not reconsidered and changed his ruling, his erroneous order would
have constituted an abuse of discretion under the cases
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cited in Point I herein, from which plaintiff would have
appealed; if such had been the case, the appellate court
would still have been faced with the identical basic issue
on appeal, and under the extraordinary facts of this
case, plaintiff would, in that event, have been entitled to
a reversal.
The only case relied upon by defendants is Utah
State Employees Credit Union -vs- Riding, 24 Utah 2d ·
211, 469 P.2d I. In that case, the court did make a dicta
statement that it was unaware of a motion under our
rules for reconsideration of a judgment. The court went
on, however, to decide the case on entirely different
grounds and expressly assumed in the opinion that such
a motion could be entertained. There was no discussion
in the Riding case as to the applicability of Rule 59 or
Rule 60, nor was there any reason to discuss them, as
the case was decided on other grounds. Rule 59 ( e)
specifically gives the court power to "alter or amend
the judgment."
It must be conceded that under some circumstances,
it would be improper for a trial judge to entertain a
motion to reconsider his ruling. Such was the case in
Drury -vs- Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662,
wherein it was held that the trial court after once considering and granting to a litigant a new trial, could not
later vacate the new trial. It is important to note that
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the Drury case was decided in favor of preventing an·
injustice and giving all of the parties the right to a new
trial on the merits where errors had been claimed. The
court also stated as follows:

"It should he ohserved that what we have
said herein is intended to apply to the fact situation shown in the instant case where, pursuant to regular procedure, the court has acted
deliberately and advisedly in granting the new
trial. However, we also recognize that there
may be situations where an order denying or
granting a new trial may have been made by
inadvertence or mistake, or where there was
some irregularity in connection with the obtaining or the granting of the order, in which instance, the court could, of course, act to correct
any such mistake or irregularity."
At the end of the above quotation, the court made reference by footnote to Rule 60, which is the same rule
upon which plaintiff in this case relies: The real issue
in this case is whether Rule 60 could be properly invoked to g-rant plaintiff relief. These issues are fully
covered under Points I and II of this brief.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities
as cited herein, plaintiff respectfully requests the court
to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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